Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CASE FILE NO. 12-56638
(D.C. Case No. 12-cv-03626-JFW-PJW)

JANE DOE NO. 14,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INTERNET BRANDS, INC., d/b/a
MODELMAYHEM. COM,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES

PATRICK FRAIOLI
ERVIN COHEN & JESSUP LLP
Attorney for Internet Brands, Inc.
9401 Wilshire Boulevard, Ninth Floor
Beverly Hills, CA 90212-2974
Telephone: (310) 273-6333
Facsimile: (310) 859-2325
WENDY GIBERTI
IGENERAL COUNSEL, P.C.
Attorney for Internet Brands, Inc.
9595 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
Telephone: (310) 300-4082
Facsimile: (310) 300-8401

13379.2:1766638.1

Case: 12-56638, 03/15/2013, ID: 8552943, DktEntry: 13, Page 2 of 18

1
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TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1,

4 Appellee Internet Brands, Inc., d/b/a ModelMayhem.com ("Appellee"), a California Corporation,
5 certifies that Appellee has a parent company, Micro Holding Corp.; no publicly held corporation
6 holds more than 10% of its stock.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
(a)

Statutory Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the District
Court

This civil action originated in the District Court based upon diversity
jurisdiction. The parties are citizens of different states and Plaintiff/Appellant
seeks damages in excess of $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(b)

Basis for Claiming Order Appealed From is Final and
Appealable; Statutory Basis of Appellate Court Jurisdiction

Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from the District Court's Order entered on
August 16, 2013, dismissing the Plaintff/Appellant's Complaint with prejudice
pursuant to Fed. Rule. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Appellate courts have jurisdiction over
final decisions of the district courts that dispose of all claims as to all parties.
Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738, 747 (9th
Cir. 2008); 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
(c)

Timeliness of Appeal

"In a civil case, the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk
within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(A) The District Court dismissed the Appellant's Complaint with
prejudice on August 16, 2013. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on September,
5, 2013—twenty (20) days following entry of the dismissal. Respondent does not
dispute that this appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW
Headquartered in El Segundo, California, Appellee, Internet Brands, is a
media company that operates various websites and also develops and licenses
internet software and, social and professional media applications. Within its
Consumer Internet Division, Appellee owns and operates more than 200 principal
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websites in seven different categories. One of the websites owned and operated by
Appellee is "modelmayhem.com" (the "Website")—a social and professional
networking site for models, make-up artists, stylists, and photographers. (ER' 5)
Appellant, Jane Doe No. 14, alleges she was assaulted by someone she met
through the Website.2 Specifically, Appellant alleges she was "lured to come to
South Florida" where she was drugged and assaulted by unrelated third parties,
Flanders and Callum. (ER 11, ¶ 2)) Based upon her allegations, Appellant claims
that Appellee, as the Website owner, should be liable for the acts of these third
parties because, (1) "[Appellant] was never warned nor given any information
about this scheme by [Appellee], despite the fact that she was a
MODELMAYHEM.COM member, which made her particularly vulnerable to the
scheme" (ER 13, ¶ 10) and (2) [Appellee] had the requisite knowledge to avoid
future victimizations of MODELMAYHEM.COM users by warning user of online
predators generally, and of the scheme employed by Flanders and Callum in
particular." (ER 16-17, ¶ 28) Appellant further alleges that Appellee had a duty to
warn, a duty to disclose, and a "duty of protection from reasonably foreseeable
harm." (ER 17 ¶ 33-34). Finally, Appellant alleges that her injuries were caused,
"as a direct and proximate result of the fraudulent solicitation, drugging, and
rape..." (ER 14, ¶ 14) Put simply, Appellant's claim relies entirely on her theory
that Appellee had a common law duty to warn.

' Refers to Appellant's Excerpts of Record ("ER")
Due to the District Court granting its Motion to Dismiss, Appellee did not
file an Answer to the allegations in the Complaint. Appellee denies substantially
all allegations in Appellant's Complaint, including that the alleged assailant
contacted Appellant through the Website. Review of her account reveals she was
not contacted by the alleged assailants through the Website.
2
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court did not err in granting the Appellee's Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend because Appellant's claim is barred by
the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230(c) ("CDA"). The CDA
provides Web-based service providers, such as the Appellee, broad immunity from
claims, such as negligence, stemming from their publication of information created
by third parties. The Appellant cannot possibly amend her Complaint to state a
cause of action against the Appellee and her avenue for relief lies with third-party
tortfeasors, and alleged criminals who are the proximate cause of her damages.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A District Court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is reviewed de novo. Edwards v. Marth Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058,
1061 (9th Cir. 2004). A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) should be upheld if "'it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief[.]"' Id. citing, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 45-46 (1957).
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING APPELLANT'S
ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION—NEGLIGENCE—FAILED TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED
A.

Appellee Moved for Dismissal Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule
12(b)(6), Which Was Granted.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
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Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following
defenses by motion:
***

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
***

A Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is similar to the common law
general demurrer, i.e., it tests the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the
Complaint. "The issue is not whether a plaintiffs success on the merits is likely
but rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed beyond the threshold in
attempting to establish [her] claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 236,
94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90. In considering a Motion to Dismiss brought under
Rule 12(b)(6), the court's duty is to, "determine whether or not it appears...under
existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that might be
proved in support of plaintiffs' claims." De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48
(9th Cir. 1978) "A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of two
reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a
cognizable legal claim." Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530,
534 (9th Cir. 1984).
Appellant's only claim—a claim of negligence for failure to warn

is fatally

defective. Applicable law does not create a duty of care, a duty to warn, and
provides immunity under the circumstances alleged in the original Complaint. As
"no relief can be granted under any set of facts that might be proved in support of
[Appellant's] claim" as pleaded, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was
appropriate. The District Court properly applied the correct law to the admitted
facts in this case.
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B.

This Court Upholds Authority Providing Broad Immunity to
"Publishers or Speakers"

The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with well-settled authority that establishes
Appellee does not have a duty to warn its users of the harm alleged and is
absolutely immune from liability for the harm alleged in this case. Under the law,
"Web-based service providers", such as the Appellee are provided a broad
immunity from claims stemming from their publication of information created by
third parties.
In rendering its decision, the District Court carefully evaluated the
applicable Ninth Circuit and California authority in a comprehensive minute order
with a detailed statement of ruling, citing the factual and procedural background,
legal standard and discussion. (ER 5-9). The Court found the facts in the instant
case nearly identical to those of Doe II v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561
(2009). The court in Doe II carefully and thoroughly reviewed voluminous state
and federal decisions regarding similar claims to that in this case, and concluded
that web-based service providers, such as the Appellee, are not liable for common
law torts committed by one user against another user, absent a separate contractual
obligation, which does not exist in this case.
The question posed by this appeal is: Can an Internet Web server such
as MySpace Incorporated, be held liable when a minor is sexually
assaulted by an adult she met on its Web site? The answer hinges on
our interpretation of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
We hold section 230 immunizes MySpace from liability. (citations
omitted).
The Doe II court's interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§230(c) (the "CDA"), relied upon extensive and unanimous authority upholding
the immunity granted by the CDA to web-based service providers for all civil
claims brought by a web user for harm caused by another user, as set forth more
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fully below. The Doe II court's interpretation of section 230 of the CDA began
with a review of the express language of the statute, which provides, in pertinent
part:
Protection for 'good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
`No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of —
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1).
The Doe II court specifically found that section 230 of the CDA applied to all
common law torts. "The express language of the statute indicates Congress did not
intend to limit its grant of immunity to defamation. Instead, the legislative history
demonstrates Congress intended to extend immunity to all civil claims." Doe II,
175 Cal. App. 4th at 568.
The court reviewed uniform authority from this and other jurisdictions,
including Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Jane Doe v.
MySpace"); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); and
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Zeran"). Each of those
cases is directly on point; the first two of which involve the sexual exploitation,
abuse, or assault of female victims. The Doe II court concluded that the Jane Doe
v. MySpace case was "exactly on point" and similarly ruled that the CDA provided
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immunity to web-based service providers, such as the Appellee. Doe II, at 573, fn.
6. In the Jane Doe v. MySpace case, the Fifth Circuit also held that the immunity
provision of the CDA still applied even if the Defendant had actual knowledge of
the alleged tortious conduct. "Thus like strict liability, liability upon notice has a
chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech. . . Because the probable effects of
distributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider selfregulations are directly contrary to §230's statutory purposes, we will not assume
that Congress intended to leave liability upon notice intact." Jane Doe v.
MySpace, supra, at 419 (quoting Zeran, supra, at 333.)
The Doe II court also relied upon the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Zeran, supra, quoting:
Congress' purpose in providing the §230 immunity was thus evident.
Interactive computer services have millions of users. The amount of
information communicated via interactive computer services is
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each
message republished by their services, interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid
any such restrictive effect.
Id. at 567. (quoting Zeran, at 331). Finally, authority is also well-settled that a
web-based service provider need not adopt safety measures in order to receive the
protection afforded by the CDA. Doe II, at 572-73 ("That appellants characterize
their complaint as one for failure to adopt reasonable safety measures does not
avoid the immunity granted by section 230").
In this case, Appellant's allegations are identical to those pleaded in the Doe
II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases. Appellant alleges she was contacted through
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the Website and was "lured" to South Florida by her assailants. Her harm occurred
off-line as a result of tortious conduct by two individuals un-affiliated with
Appellee. As in the other cases cited by the Doe II court, the allegations do not
give rise to a cause of action against the web-based service provider because
Appellee did not owe Appellant a duty to warn, and is entitled to the broad
immunity provided under the CDA. Therefore, Appellant has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted because under the circumstances, as a matter of
law, Appellant cannot possibly overcome the broad immunity provisions under the
CDA and the applicable case law. The District Court therefore did not err in
dismissing Appellant's Complaint with prejudice.
Lastly, Appellant cannot plead or allege that Appellee failed to perform in
accordance with any legally recognized duty which was the proximate cause of her
injuries. As with the Doe II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases, the injury occurred
off-line, which means the web-based service provider was not the proximate cause
of the Appellant's injury. Julie Doe II, at 574. Here, Appellant pleaded that her
injuries were caused by unrelated third parties, not Appellee. As such, and
consistent with authority on this point, Appellant cannot state a claim for relief in
the absence of a proximate causation allegation, which is an additional,
independent basis upon which to dismiss the Complaint. The District Court's
dismissal of the Appellant's Complaint would therefore also have been proper due
to the absence of proximate causation on the allegations by Appellee.
C.

The Ruling in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. Did Not Create an Exception
to the Immunity Provided by the CDA for Tort Claims.

Appellant relies entirely on this Court's holding in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009). However, Appellant grossly misstates the holding
in that case and its inapplicability to the very different record in this case.
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Appellant also fails to address another opinion issued only 8 days later in Goddard
v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
First, the Barnes case held that the CDA did protect Yahoo!, a Web-based
service provider, from liability for negligence, but did not immunize it from a
promissory estoppel claim arising from entirely different facts, where Yahoo!
contracted to remove certain posts from its site. However, the Court was clear in its
narrow ruling:
Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a
breach of contract claim under the theory of promissory
estoppel, subsection 230(c)(1) of the Act does not
preclude her cause of action.4
Only eight days later, in the Google case, this Court discussed extensively the
application of the new ruling in Barnes and held as follows:
Read as broadly as possible, Barnes stands for the
proposition that when a party engages in conduct giving
rise to an independent and enforceable contractual
obligation, that party may be "h[eld] ... liable [not] as a
publisher or speaker of third-party content, but rather as a
counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who has
breached.
The court went on to discuss that there was no allegation that Google ever
promised the Plaintiff it would do something above and beyond what it was
otherwise obligated to do, and refused to extend the Barnes holding. The same is
true here. Appellee is not alleged to have as a publisher of third-party content,
become a promisor of independent and enforceable contractual obligations, and
then breached those obligations. Thus, Barnes has no applicability to this case.
Similarly, Appellant's contention that Appellee somehow assumed a duty to
warn by filing suit against the prior owners of the Website, for breach of contract
4

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
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and fraud in the sale of the Website, also fails. First, that Complaint is not part of
the record on appeal. Moreover, Appellant's contention is contradicted by its own
admission and by Barnes. Appellant here claims only that the suit showed
knowledge of other torts or crimes, giving rise to a duty to warn. (ER 16, 11122-18,
¶40.) As set forth above, this does not give rise to a duty to warn on the part of
web-based publishers of third-party content. Nor does it bring the facts of this case
within Barnes' narrow "independent and enforceable contractual obligation"
exception, since no such promise or obligation was ever even alleged in this case.
It is a classic red herring.

III.
CONCLUSION
The law is well-settled and unanimous; the CDA provides immunity to webbased service providers for common law torts committed by website users.
Persons injured or otherwise damaged by third party tortfeasors are not without
remedy, and may hold directly liable the person(s) causing the harm. Appellant's
relief rests with the alleged third party tortfeasors, but her claim against Appellee is
barred as a matter of law under the CDA and applicable case law.
By:
s/ PatrickTraioli
Patrick Fraioli
Ervin Cohen & Jessup LLP
Attorneys for Internet Brands. Inc.
9401 Wilshire Blvd.. 9th Floor
Beverly Hills. CA 90212-2974
Tel: (310) 273-6333
Fax: (310) 859-2325
Wendy Giberti
iGeneral Counsel. P.C.
Attorneys for Internet Brands. Inc.
9595 Wilshire Blvd.. Suite 900
Beverly Hills. CA 90212
Tel: (310) 300-4082
Fax: (310) 300-8401
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
The undersigned is unaware of any related cases pending in this Court.
s/ Patrick Fraioli
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